Jean Monnet Center of Excellence

Abstract: Research on representation within the European Union (EU) often assumes that partisan policy preferences are mediated primarily through the European Parliament, while the European Council and Council of the EU (Council) represent national interests. This assumption obfuscates the potential for divergent policy preferences within Council delegations, the majority of which are coalitions comprised of ideologically diverse parties. Such divergent preferences within national governments provide an incentive for coalition partners to pursue policy outcomes at the EU level that diverge from those of their coalition. This research assesses the existence of such policy shirking by members of the Council utilizing the DEU III dataset, party manifestos, and a new dataset on the partisan characteristics of individual Council members. This analysis provides insights into the factors that affect variations between national positions (as measured by the DEU III) and coalition member preferences (as reflected in party manifestos).

Abstract: Building on the existing research on the European Commission’s agenda-setting powers, this study examines the relationship between the policy priorities of the Commission and those of the other key policy actors in the European Union to determine the impact of other EU institutional actor preferences on the success of Commission priority initiatives. By using new and existing datasets to compare the European Commission’s Work Programmes with European Council Summit Conclusions, the European Parliament’s own initiative reports and Council Presidency Work Programmes, we are able to analyse the effect of policy priority congruence on the Commission’s success and measure the autonomous policy influence of the Commission more accurately. Our results demonstrate that the Commission’s priority initiatives are significantly more likely to result in legislative outcomes when they address policy topics already highlighted (whether fortuitously or as a result of Commission efforts) by the other key EU institutions. They also suggest that interpretations of the EU political system that ascribe the role of political executive to the Commission misconstrue its role.

Abstract: This article examines the conditions under which the European Parliament (EP) effectively exercises its informal agenda setting powers to directly influence the content of the European Union’s policy agenda through the use of ‘own initiative reports’ or EPOIR. We test three models of EPOIR influence (salience, linkage and ideology) utilizing a newly created dataset of all substantive references to EPOIR within Commission pre-legislative communications and legislative proposals produced between 2000 and 2017. These references serve as the dependent variable in our analysis, which seeks to identify the traits of EPOIR that increase their likelihood of exerting agenda influence. Our findings suggest not only that EPOIR can and do help to shape the EU policy agenda, but that salience and inter-institutional linkage are the most effective attributes in explaining when this type of EP agenda setting effort via EPOIR is most likely to be successful.

Abstract: The European Parliament (EP) is one of the most studied legislatures in the world. The general consensus in most of these analyses is that the power of the EP in the legislative decision-making processes of the EU has increased precipitously, particularly since the introduction of the co-decision procedure. One continuing perceived weakness of the EP, however, is its inability to introduce new legislation. While the EP can request that the Commission initiate a policy proposal, it lacks the power to formally introduce bills itself. This is an anomaly among legislatures in democratic systems, which generally have at least the formal right to try to set the policy agenda through the initiation of bills. This research looks at the indirect agenda setting power of the EP through an analysis of EP own initiative (INI) resolutions and their impact on the policy agenda of the EU. The research introduces a new dataset on all EP resolutions between 2000 and 2015 and compares the pre- and post-2009 period to assess whether the recent formal treaty changes to the legislative role of the EP have affected its agenda-setting capacity. The results suggest that despite its lack of a formal power of initiative the EP is able shape the legislative agenda of the EU in under certain circumstances, particularly post-Lisbon.

Abstract: While there are many studies that focus on the changing power of the European Parliament (EP), the shifting relationships between European Union (EU) institutions has received far less attention. Few consider the impact of the transformation of the EP on the other core EU institutions, particularly the Commission and Council. Together these three institutions determine the policy outcomes of the EU, but how they work together and the changing balance of power between them is largely a mystery. This research seeks to fill this lacuna by examining the relative policy influence of these institutions through the lens of policy preference congruence and inter-institutional policy coalitions. Utilizing the DEU II dataset to measure institutional policy preferences and policy outcomes it is possible to discern patterns of policy preference congruence between these institutions and assess their relative influence over policy outcomes. This research finds that previous expectations of a stable policy coalition between the two “supranational” actors are no longer accurate. Increasingly the EP and the Council share policy congruence and form effective policy coalitions. Moreover, the historical dependence of the EP on the support of the Commission has diminished, while the Council continues to exert largely independent policy influence.

Abstract: The Council of the EU (Council) has been at the center of European Union (EU) decision-making since the earliest days of the European Economic Community. However, the exact nature of its central role has changed dramatically as the EU has evolved. In particular, its core function within the EU’s institutional structure has shifted from a nearly autocratic body encompassing both executive and legislative powers, to one chamber in a largely symmetrical bicameral legislature with an increasingly limited executive function. This evolution is less well understood than the development of other key EU institutions, in part because the transformation of the Council has been both gradual and indirect. Indeed, the Council itself has never been the subject of significant institutional reforms. Instead successive formal and informal changes to the character and powers of the European Parliament (EP) and the European Council (EUCO) have effectively pulled legislative and executive authority (respectively) away from the Council. This research traces this evolution in interinstitutional relations and powers within a historical institutional framework, employing careful process tracing to investigate the decisions that led to these institutional transformations. Focusing on the 1974 summit that led to both the formal creation of the European Council and the direct election of the EP as a critical juncture, we examine subsequent decisions from both rational choice and logics of appropriateness perspectives. In this way we are able to trace the path dependent trajectories that explain the current institutional balance of powers and the dramatic transformation of the character of the Council.